“The Day After the Recall: Policing and Prosecution in San Francisco”, with Lauren Schechter and Dvir Yogev
Prosecutors' policies and decisions are often the subjects of high-profile political debates and research studies on crime and recidivism. However, the effect of prosecutor policies on crime can be confounded by any simultaneous changes in police behavior. In this paper, we explore the effect of a contentious relationship between a local District Attorney and the corresponding police department during a political campaign to recall the DA. With policing, prosecution, and jail data from San Francisco, we use a regression kink in time design to study how local prosecutor politics affect police behavior. We find that police increase their effort after the "unfriendly" district attorney is recalled, resulting in an immediate increase in the local jail population. Our findings illustrate the importance of accounting for police departments' responses to prosecutorial politics when considering the effects of prosecutor policies on crime.
Work in Progress
“Political Accountability, Bureaucracy, and Criminal Justice: Evidence from North Carolina”, with Felipe Diaz and Alok Ranjan
“Guns, Crime, and Hetereogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of Right-to-Carry Laws”, with Ryan Quandt
“Prosecution Research Initiative”, with Amanda Agan, Anna Harvey, and Lauren Schechter
An ongoing, multi-year project with $1,000,000 funding, in partnership with several large district attorneys' offices, using detailed administrative case data to study the effects of prosecutors' policies and decision making on recidivism, public safety, and racial disparities in the criminal justice system.